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This paper was originally written as a contribution to a research project 
on "Sources and Hierarchy of EC Law", directed by Prof. Gerd Winter 
(Zentrum fiir Europaische Rechtspolitk an der Universitat Bremen) and 
financed by the European Parliament. It will also appear in a collective 
publication: Gerd Winter (ed.), Reforming the Categories and Hierarchy of 
EC Legal Acts. I would like to express my gratitude to the editor for his kind 
authorization to publish my study in the EUI Working Papers series.
The original purpose and the necessarily limited dimension of this paper 
help to explain why it is not an exhaustive analyisis of the Spanish system of 
sources of law, but only an overall exposition of its major characteristics. Some 
questions which may be of particular interest for a potential reform of EC law 
have been discussed in detail. In any event, my objective has been to provide 
a clear overview of the status quaestionis. Given the complexity of the system 
of sources of law in Spain, a more ambitious approach would have been naive.
Rory O’Connell has generously read the text and made many suggestions 
to improve its intelligibilty. I am grateful to him.
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(Spanish Constitution of 1978).
Ley Orgànica del Poder Judicial 
(Organic Law of the Judiciary of 1985).
Ley Orgànica del Tribunal Constitutional 
(Organic Law of the Constitutional Court of 1979).
Sentencia del Tribunal Constitutional
(Judgement of the Constitutional Court, cited according to its
official numeration).
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo




























































































I. SOURCES OF LAW AS A SYSTEM.
1. The Constitution and its binding force.
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 is not intended to be a merely 
programmatic or political document. It is an entrenched constitutional charter 
(Arts. 166 and 167 CE), hirerarchically superior to any other rule of the 
domestic legal system and legally binding both on private individuals and public 
authorities (Art. 9.1 CE). The Constitutional Court has repeatedly declared that, 
except for the Preamble, the whole Constitution is to be treated as having fully 
normative value (STC 15/1982,16/1982, 80/1982, etc.). Therefore, there are not 
any purely declaratory clauses in the Constitution.
However, not all the constitutional provisions create the same degree of 
obligation. There is a minimum legal force, common to all of them, namely that 
every constitutional provision binds the legislature. This means that, if a statute 
or any other subordinate legal rule is found to be in contradiction with a 
constitutional provision, it may be invalidated. This is true even in relation to 
the so called "Guiding Principles of Social and Economic Policy", embodied in 
Chapter 3 of Title I of the Constituion, which mostly proclaim social rights. The 




























































































implemented (Art. 53.3 CE) does not preclude their binding nature for the 
legislature. Other types of constitutional provisions, such as those which declare 
civil and political rights or establish the organization and functioning of State 
bodies, enjoy a stronger form of legal force and, consequently, are directly 
applicable.
The binding force of the Constitution means that it must be enforced by 
law courts. In Spain, there is a centralized model of judicial review of 
legislation. In other words, the power to decide about the constitutionality of 
statutes is vested in a single Constitutional Court (Arts. 161 and 163 CE), which 
is separated from the rest of the judiciary. Its twelve members are appointed in 
the following way: four by the Senate and four by the Chamber of Deputies, in 
both cases through qualified majority; two by the General Council of the 
Judicial Power and two by the Government. Their tenure is of nine years and 
they may not be immediately reappointed. The Constitutional Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to invalidate statutes and international treaties. This can 
take place through two different procedures. The first is the direct recourse, for 
which only certain public bodies (50 Deputies, 50 Senators, the Prime Minister, 
the Ombudsman and the Regions) have standing within a deadline of two 
months after the promulgation of the challenged statute. The second form is the 




























































































any time, provided that the challenged statute is relevant for the decision of a 
pending case. In addition, the Constitutional Court has also exclusive jurisdiction 
to decide the conflicts between the State and the Regions.
The existence of a specific Constitutional Court, however, does not mean 
that the other law courts may not apply the Constitution. On the contrary, they 
have a positive duty to do so. Not only must they assess the constitutionality of 
legislation, which can lead to a question to the Constitutional Court, but they 
must also enforce directly applicable constitutional provisions. This is especially 
important in the field of fundamental rights, where the direct recourse of 
individuals to the Constitutional Court (recurso de amparo) has a subsidiary 
nature with respect to ordinary judicial protection. In other words, this form of 
access to the Constitutional Court is conditioned on the exhaustion of ordinary 
judicial remedies. In addition, as far as constitutionality of norms is concerned, 
the monopoly of the Constitutional Court covers only statutory law. So inferior 
legal rules may be declared unconstitutional by ordinary courts.
2. Basic principles governing the system of sources of law.
The Constitution has introduced an extremely, sometimes unnecesarily, 




























































































subdivision of statutory law into different types of statues, a remarkably wide 
sphere for administrative rule-making and the autonomuos law-making power 





Statutes (Organic Laws/Ordinary Laws) Statutes
Regulations Local Regulations Regulations
In order to understand corrrectly the various types of legal rules, as well 
as their reciprocal relations, it is necessary to look briefly at three groups of 
constitutional principles which inspire and govern the whole system of sources 
of law.
A) Hierarchy and competence.




























































































inferior rule may not contradict a superior one and, if this happens, the inferior 
rule is void. Normative hierarchy, explicitly proclaimed in Art. 9 of the 
Constitution, is the main governing principle of the Spanish system of sources 
of law. Thus, the Constitution is the supreme law of the whole system, statutes 
are superior to administartive regulations, etc.
Nevertheless, there are certain types of legal rules whose reciprocal 
relationships do not have a hierarchical nature. This is due to the fact that their 
respective normative spheres do not coincide, either subtantively (different 
subject-matters) or geographically (different territories). In this case, the 
governing principle is competence, in the sense that only the competent type of 
legal rule may govern that subject-matter or that territory. The principle of 
competence determines the relationship between organic laws and ordinary laws, 
as well as that between State law and Regional law on the whole. For example, 
strictly speaking, one may not say that a Regional regulation is hierarchically 
subordinated to a State statute.
Two further features of these two principles must be underlined. On the 
one hand, any violation of either principle involves the invalidity of the legal 
rule thus produced. On the other hand, hierarchy and competence operate in a 




























































































be in contradiction with a superior one. Therefore, in order to assess the 
compliance with hierarchical requirements, it is necessary to compare the 
subtantive contents of two rules. The principle of competence means that only 
a certain type of rale may regulate a given subject-matter or within a given 
territory, so that an incompetent rale will be void even if its substantive content 
is compatible with that of other competent rales. The compliance with the 
principle of competence involves a purely formal evaluation.
B) Rationalized parliamentarism.
Among the main original objectives of the Spanish Constitution was 
governmental stability. For this reason, a series of devices was introduced: a 
Senate with lesser powers, possibility of governmental veto over the introduction 
of financial bills, individual parliamentary investiture of the Prime Minister, 
designation and dismissal of members of the Government by the Prime Minister, 
constructive vote of no confidence, etc. In addition, the electoral formula for the 
Chamber of Deputies, which is proportional but with some restrictions (so-called 
"D’Hondt rule"), favours the emergence of few big political parties and, in this 
sense, of a genuine dualism majority-opposition. All these factors have led to 
a rationalized version of parliamentarism or even to a variety of 




























































































reproduced at a regional level.
These considerations are relevant in the field of sources of law. Without 
prejudice to what will later be said about the debate over the scope of 
administrative rule-making, it is a fact that the Government has an autonomous, 
albeit indirect, democratic legitimacy and, consequently, it is widely 
acknowledged that the major political antagonism does not take place between 
Government and Parliament but between majority and opposition. The corollary 
of this is that statutory law is no longer regarded as the major gurantee of 
freedom. Parliament tends to be conceived predominantly as a forum for 
political debate and supervision of governmental action. If one adds that the rule 
of law is protected through a vast complex of judicial remedies, including the 
recurso de amparo for fundamental rights, it is easy to understand that the 
growth of administrative law-making is not, as such, seen as a cause for 
concern.
C) Political decentralization.
Spain has a politically decentralized structure. It is only because of 
emotional connotations attached to certain words that it is not defined as a 




























































































government and enjoy legislative and administrative powers. There is, however, 
a single judiciary for the whole nation.
Not all the Regions have the same powers, because the politically 
decentralized structure was not directly created by the Constitution. Due to a 
lack of a general consensus in this respect during the constituent period, the 
Constitution simply established the legal basis for a process of decentralization. 
Thus, each Region has been created through its corresponding statute of 
autonomy, which is simultaneously its basic norm. It is the statute of autonomy 
that defines the Region’s powers.
Generally speaking, Regions have three types of powers: exclusive 
legislative power in a few fields (land planning, social welfare, etc.); concurrent 
legislative power in many areas (health care, transport, environment, etc.); 
executive power in some fields which belong to the State exclusive legislative 
power (water use, libraries and museums, etc.), as well as in those areas where 
they have legislative powers. For this reason, both statutory law and 
administrative law-making are produced at State and Regional level. The 
relationship between State law and Regional law is governed by the principle 
of competence. The constitutional clause of priority of State law (Art. 149.3 CE) 




























































































3. The role of judicial case-law.
In order to have a panoramic view of the Spanish system of sources of 
law, some reference has to be made to the status of case-law. As happens in 
most countries which belong to the civil law family, case-law has not tradionally 
been regarded as a genuine source of law, at least in the same sense as 
legislation or custom. It has been conceived as a sort of complement or an 
instrument for the uniform interpretation and application of rules with a 
legislative origin. However, the complexity of modem society and a clear 
process of decodification of the legal system have led in practice to an 
increasing importance of judge-made law. This, in its turn, has opened a debate 
on whether it is possible or not to speak of case-law as a real source of law.
Given the unquestionable present importance of the judicial function 
giving sense to obscure legislation and filling in legislative gaps, the debate has 
a predominantly abstract nature. But there are two aspects of it which deserve 
to be stressed. On the one hand, the case-law of the Constitutional Court is a 
genuine source of law, legally binding upon all the other law courts. The 
Organic Law of the Judiciary explicitly states that judges must interpret every 
legal rule in conformity with the Constitution and that, in doing so, they must 




























































































case-law of the different sections (civil, criminal, labour and administrative) of 
the Supreme Court does not have the same formal binding force. Despite its 
authoritativeness and persuasive force, no judge would behave unlawfully if he 
deviated from the Supreme Court’s established interpretation of legislation. 
Morover, it is precisely this judicial interpretative independence that allows a 
renewal of case-law (Art. 117 CE). This statement is important because, in civil 
law countries, judges are liable for their judicial activity. In this sense, no 
Spanish judge could ever been held liable for not having followed the Supreme 
Court’s case-law. Neither criminally nor in disciplinary terms, does such 




























































































IL THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION.
1. Formal characteristics of statutes.
In Spain, a statute is any normative document which has been enacted by 
the legislature. This definition includes, of course, Regional legislatures. State 
statutes have to be approved by simple majority in both houses, signed and 
promulgated by the King, who lacks any veto power, and published in the 
official journal (Arts. 90 and 91 CE). With the exception of certain subject- 
matters (international affaires, financial legislation, organic laws and framework 
legislation), either house can delegate the final approval of a bill to a 
parliamentary committee (Art. 75.2 CE). The statute thus passed has the same 
force as if it had been approved by the whole house. As for Regional statutes, 
they have to be approved by simple majority in the unicameral Regional 
Parliament, signed and promulgated by the Regional President, who also lacks 
any veto power, and published in the corresponding journal. Publication of 
Regional statutes in the national official journal is also compulsory, but it does 
not determine the date of their coming into force.
Although they are sometimes drafted in a vague and declamatory way, all 




























































































are preambles, which are not infrequent and have a purely explanatory value. 
Statutes are divided into articles. These basic statutory provisions are usually 
grouped into chapters and titles.
All statutes are directly subordinated to the Constitution. In the scale of 
normative hierarchy, there is not any other source of law between the 
Constitution and statutes. In principle, all of them enjoy the same legal status, 
which is defined as statutory force. This means that any legal rule having 
statutory force can repeal previous statutory law and, conversely, only a new 
rule with statutory force will be able to abrogate it. As has been said, only the 
Constitutional Court has the power to invalidate rules with statutory force.
2. The scope of legislative power and the contents of statutes.
Contrary to what happens in other countries where parliamentarism has 
been subject to rationalization, in Spain there is no restriction on the law-making 
power of Parliament. The legislature may pass a statute on any conceivable 
issue, of course as long as it does not violate a constitutional provision. In 
practice, respect for fundamental rights is the only limit of statutes and there is 




























































































This principle is applicable to Regional statutes too. But it has to be 
qualified, in the sense that Regional Parliaments may legislate about any issue 
only within their scope of competence. There is no Regional reserve of 
administrative rule-making either. As far as State statutory law is concerned, it 
may affect any subject-matter, because State law is subsidiary vis-à-vis Regional 
law (Art. 149.3 CE); that is, State law must be used to fill in the gaps in 
Regional law. Since not all the Regions have identical legislative powers, the 
State may legislate without encroaching on the competence of some Regions. 
Incidentally, this helps to understand why the national legislature tends to 
behave as if it were still in a centralized country.
Regarding the contents of statutes, there is no explicit constitutional 
requirement. In particular, statutory rules need not have a general and abstract 
nature. They may, in principle, regulate single situations or be adressed to single 
individuals. However, one must take into account three different factors in this 
respect.
First of all, singular laws, as they are usually called, can be classified into 
two very different categories. On the one hand, are those statutes which are 
envisaged, by the Constitution or by a general statute, in order for an 




























































































selling of some State property must be previously authorized by a specific 
statute. In this case, singular laws have a merely organizational nature, as a 
means for Parliament to control executive action. On the other hand, are those 
statutes which directly affect individuals, by restricting their rights or imposing 
duties on them. Only this second category may be seriously questioned in 
constitutional terms.
Secondly, since 1978, there has been only one case of a law which 
directly encroached on an individual’s rights. It was the expropriation of 
Rumasa, a relatively important industrial and financial group, in early 1983. The 
alleged reason was that its unorthodox practices were a danger for national 
economic stability; and the legal mechanism was a decree-law, which was later 
ratified and transformed into a statute by Parliament. In its most important ruling 
concernig this case (STC 166/1986), the Constitutional Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the measure. In substance, a deeply divided Court said that 
there was no violation of the principle of equality before the law (Art. 14 CE) 
because extraordinary circumstances may allow for individualized legislation. Up 
to that point, the argumentation was reasonably acceptable. Less convincing and 
bitterly criticized by many scholars was its finding that there was no violation 
of the right of access to justice (Art. 24.1 CE) on the ground that the case had 




























































































that in this type of procedure parties to the original process may not appear 
before the Constitutional Court. In addition, the recurso de amparo might not 
have been used, since individuals’ direct challenge against statutes is not 
admissible. In sum, there is no direct remedy against statutes in Spanish law. It 
was precisely for this reason that, when the case arrived at the European Court 
on Human Rights, Spain was condemned for violation of Art. 6 of the 
Convention (Ruiz Mateos v. Kingdom of Spain, 23 June 1993). Moreover, one 
could also argue that singular laws deprive affected individuals of guarantees 
inherent to administrative procedure.
Lastly, it is undeniable that there has been a very limited use of singular 
laws in recent times. This is due not so much to its questionable constitutional 
validity, as to the circumstance that a rationalized variety of parliamentarism 
puts so many instruments in the hands of Government that, politically speaking, 
singular laws are not really needed.
3. Organic laws.
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 has adhered to the idea of organic laws; 
that is, given the political importance of certain legal issues, a wide 




























































































requirement, stability of legislation may be attained. In this respect, the basic 
question is how to determine what are those politically sensitive issues. One has 
to keep this question in mind in order to understand why the status of organic 
laws is so complicated in Spanish law.
A) The origin of organic laws.
In Spain, the transition from dictatorship to democracy was conducted in 
a spirit of national reconciliation, which involved a wide consensus among the 
most important political forces. The Constitution was, thus, intended to be the 
common basic framework for all citizens. This specific context helps to explain 
two characteristics of the Spanish Constitution. First, it sought to extend this 
principle of consensual decision-making to future relevant problems even if they 
did not have a true constitutional nature. Secondly, in those constitutional points 
where consensus was not reached, no decision was taken and the lacuna should 
have to be filled in by a future qualified majority. The instrument was, in both 
cases, the organic law. Examples of the first category include the 
implementation of certain bodies and procedures envisaged in the Constitution 
(Ombudsman, Constitutional Court, judicial organization, elections, etc.); as for 
the second category, the main problem which the Constitution left open was the 




























































































However, as a reaction to the lack of legal guarantees under the 
dictatorship, the Constitution added a third sort of hypothesis where the wide 
consensus inherent to organic laws had to be reached: legislation which 
systematically develops some subject-matter within the scope of fundamental 
rights. As will be seen, it is in this open clause where lies the source of all the 
theoretical and practical problems posed by organic laws.
B) Definition and requirements.
The constitutional definition of organic laws (Art. 81 CE) is twofold: 
formal and substantive. Formally, passing organic laws requires an absolute 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, which must be reached in a final vote on 
the whole bill. In other words, consensus has to be reached having an overall 
view of the final draft. The modification or abrogation of a previous organic law 
requires, of course, a new one. It is important to stress that absolute majority 
means half plus one of the de iure number of members of the house, as opposed 
to the number of present members. For the Senate’s approval, however, simple 
majority is enough. In addition, since Art. 81 of the Constitution explicitly 
mentions the Chamber of Deputies, it is clear that Regional Parliaments may not 
pass organic laws. As far as substance is concerned, certain issuess must be 




























































































general electoral law, some bodies explicitly mentioned in other constitutional 
provisions, and the development of fundamental rights.
The most relevant problem posed by organic laws concerns the 
relationship between their formal and substantive elements. Since its very first 
ruling on this topic (STC 5/1981), the Constitutional Court has always held that 
the concept of organic laws is not a purely formal one. This means that the 
legislature is not free to decide whether a given statute should be passed as an 
organic law. The constitutional definition of organic laws implies not only that 
certain subject-matters must be regulated by organic laws, but also that the 
potential sphere of organic laws is limited to those subject-matters. Such 
construction is based on democratic considerations, namely not to restrict unduly 
the freedom of future majorities. In order to define neatly the limits of organic 
laws, the Constitutional Court has declared that their relationship with ordinary 
statutes is not governed by the principle of hierarchy, but by the principle of 
competence (STC 5/1981, 6/1982, etc.). Two consequences derive from this 
statement. First, ordinary statutes are not unconstitutional for mere contradiction 
with an organic law, but only if they encroach upon a subject-matter reserved 
to organic laws; secondly, organic laws themselves are unconstitutional if they 
spill over their scope and invade the field reserved to ordinary legislation. This 




























































































organic laws is crucial.
In this respect, Art. 81 is reasonably unequivocal, except for its reference 
to fundamental rights. Nowadays, it is generally accepted that only those rights 
declared in Arts. 15 to 29 of the Constitution are covered by Art. 81 (STC 
76/1983). However, another question remains open: what does it mean to 
develop fundamental rights for the purpose of A rt 81? It cannot mean any 
possible legislation which, even indirectly, affects a fundamental right. If it were 
so, given the vis expansiva of fundamental rights in a liberal democracy, entire 
sectors of the legal system should be governed by organic laws and that would 
be in contradiction with the above mentioned democratic considerations. For this 
reason, the Constitutional Court has established that only those laws which 
directly regulate some fundamental rights issue may be organic laws (STC 
5/1981, 6/1982, etc.). But two doctrines qualify this basic statement. On the one 
hand, for the sake of clarity, coherence and good legislative drafting, the 
Constitutional Court allows the inclusion of other provisions into organic laws 
as long as they deal with connected subject-matters, i.e. subject-matters without 
whose inclusion an organic law would be technically deficient (STC 5/1981 and 
137/1986). On the other hand, in order to avoid an excessive use of the 
connected subject-matters exception, the Constitutional Court allows the 




























































































nature and, consequently, may be abrogated by an ordinary statute (STC 5/1981 
and 76/1983). Needless to say, to reconcile this doctrine with the requirement 
that organic laws must be approved through a final vote on the whole bill is far 
from easy.
In spite of all these efforts, the Constitutional Court has not been 
completely successful in restricting the expansion of organic laws. This is due 
to the fact that some fundamental rights have a huge potential scope. The most 
significant example in this respect is personal freedom (Art. 17 CE). After some 
hesitations, the Court has ended up declaring that the definition of crimes and 
punishments needs to be accomplished through organic law because it involves 
a limitation of personal freedom, especially in the form of imprisonment (STC 
160/1986). Thus, entire sectors of the legal system, such as criminal law or 
some aspects of criminal procedure, have undergone a process of entrenchment.
C) An assessment of the practice.
On the whole, one can fairly say that organic laws create serious 
difficulties without solving many problems. They may be helpful only as a 
means to postpone genuine constitutional decisions if the needed consensus 




























































































accurate definition of subject-matters is indispensable. The Spanish experience 
of fundamental rights legislation is illuminating, since an accidentally strong 
majority in Parliament is able to paralize future weaker majorities. Ultimately, 
the real question is democracy: qualified majority does not make sense for 
ordinary law-making.
4. Interposed norms.
Interposed norms are those legal rules which are a development or an 
extension of the Constitution. In this sense, although they are subordinated to 
the Constitution, they are hierarchically superior to all the other sources of law, 
including organic laws. The major consequence of the existence of interposed 
norms is that they are used as criteria to assess the constitutionality of legislation 
(Art. 28 LOTC). Any law in violation of an interposed norm is invalid, exactly 
as if it were in contradiction with the Constitution itself. For this reason, some 
authors prefer to speak of the "block of constitutionality".
The function of interposed norms is to fill in a gap which the Constitution 
left deliberately open: the territorial structure of the country. Thus, it is through 
interposed norms that the Regions were instituted and the distribution of powers 




























































































A) Statutes of autonomy.
A statute of autonomy is the normative document which, by implementing 
the corresponding constitutional provisions, creates an autonomous Region. It 
is the basic norm of that Region, i.e. the "Regional constitution". The statute of 
autonomy establishes the Regional political organization and defines the powers 
devolved to the Region. So, in order to know what powers belong to a given 
Region or to the State in that Region, one has to look into the corresponding 
statute of autonomy. The Constitution contains only a framework declaring what 
powers may be transfered to Regions. In this sense, the statute of autonomy is 
not only Regional law, but also State law. Is is constitutionally binding upon 
both levels of government.
As a consequence of their nature and function, statutes of autonomy must 
be enacted through a particularly complex procedure, which admits several 
varieties (Arts. 143 and 151 CE). What has to be stressed now is that, in any 
event, the procedure consists of two different stages, because the statute of 
autonomy must be approved first by the local authorities and possibly submitted 
to popular referendum, and only then ratified by the national Parliament through 
an organic law. As for their amendment, statutes of autonmy regulate their own 




























































































an organic law is also needed. Consequently, statutes of autonomy are especially 
rigid and cannot be characterized as normal organic laws.
B) Art. 150 of the Constitution.
Statutes of autonomy are the ordinary mechanism to devolve powers to 
the Regions and, therefore, to define the distribution of powers between the 
State and the Regions. However, the Constitution envisages the possibility for 
the national Parliament to affect unilaterally such distribution of powers by 
passing organic laws of delegation and laws of harmonization.
Through organic laws of delegation (Art. 150.2 CE), the State may 
devolve powers to the Regions without having to follow the complex amending 
procedure of statutes of autonomy. Organic laws of delegation are genuine 
interposed norms and, as such, may not be derogated or implicitly repealed by 
normal organic laws. But they present a disadvantage for Regions, because they 
are not as entrenched as the statutes of autonomy. They may be freely and 
unilaterally abrogated by the national Parliament. They were first used in the 
early 80’s in order to put certain Regions (Canary Islands, Valencia, Navarra) 
at the highest level of self-government, equivalent to that of Catalonia, Basque 




























































































adopted in 1992, in order to expand the powers of all other Regions. Two 
objectives have been thus attained. First, the simultaneous opening of several 
amending procedures of statutes of autonomy, which would have been politically 
delicate, was avoided; secondly, some uniformity was introduced into Regional 
powers. In 1994, the corresponding statutes of autonomy were amended, in order 
to introduce into them the uniform powers first delegated to the Regions by the 
1992 organic law.
Laws of harmonization (Art. 150.3 CE) enable the national Parliament to 
establish a minimum of legal uniformity throughout the country, even if it 
affects a subject-matter which belongs to Regional exclusive competence. Laws 
of harmonization are intended to be exceptional. Consequently, Art. 150.3 
requires that, as a previous stage to the initition of legislative procedure, both 
houses declare by absolute majority that harmonization in a given field is 
necessary for the sake of the general interest. Once the bill is introduced, laws 
of harmonization are passed as ordinary statutes. However, the previous stage 
involves a very delicate political debate and, for this reason, no law of 
harmonization has ever been enacted except for an unsuccessful attempt in 1982. 
On that occasion, following an independent experts’ report, the national 
Parliament passed a statute which harmonized the whole system of distribution 




























































































invalidated that law of harmonization, basically because it was deemed to be an 































































































Although they are passed directly by the Government, decree-laws have 
statutory force and, consequently, may repeal or modify previous statutes (Art. 
86 CE). However, they may not affect fundamental rights, the organization of 
basic State bodies and the distribution of powers between the State and the 
Regions. In addition, they may be enacted only under circumsatances of 
"extraordinary and urgent necessity" and must be ratified by the Chamber of 
Deputies within the next 30 days. Ratification must take place through a vote 
on the whole decree-law. Alternatively, the Chamber may decide to transform 
the decree-law into a bill, in which case it may amend its contents. Thus, the 
assessment whether there was or not a circumstnace of necessity (i.e. a 
circumstance which did not allow for the deadlines of legislative procedure) is 
primarily a responsibility of the Chamber and, therefore, a political question. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has declared that, in extreme cases, it has 
the power to invalidate a decree-law for lack of extraordinary and urgent 
necessity (STC 29/1982, 6/1983, 60/1986, etc.). On the whole, one can say that 
there has been a reasonable use of decree-laws, especially in recent years. This 




























































































2. Charactersitics of administrative regulations.
Administrative regulations are legal rules passed by the executive or by 
other administrative bodies. More generally, one can say that they cover all 
forms of written law different from statutory law. Administrative regulations 
must be approved through the appropriate procedure and, in any event, must be 
published in the corresponding official journal. Moreover, all administrative 
regulations are hierarchically subordinated to sattutory law, so that no regulation 
is allowed to contradict a statute (Arts. 9.3 and 106.1 CE).
So far, the characteristics common to all types of regulations. However, 
contrary to statutes, regulations derive from a great variety of administrative 
rule-making authorities: the Cabinet, single ministers, Regional Governments, 
local authorities, etc. Within a single sphere of competence, regulations are 
ordered in a hierarchical way according to the position of their respective 
source. Thus, for example, ministerial orders are hierarchically subordinated to 
royal decrees, i.e. regulations approved by the Cabinet itself. In order to know 
what public bodies have administrative rule-making power, one has to look into





























































































the statutes which create those bodies or delegate normative functions to them. 
In other words, there is not a general, constitutional recognition of administrative 
rule-making power, except for the Government as a collective body (Art. 97 
CE).
Another important difference with statutory law is that administrative 
regulations must have general and abstract contents. They may not include 
singular rules. The reason for this lies in the principle of legality of 
administrative action (Art. 103.1 CE), which implies that administrative bodies 
may not deviate from legal rules even if such rules have been passed by 
themselves. This doctrine, which has been explicitly proclaimed in several 
statutory documents, is important for another reason, namely that there is not 
any nomen iuris or official name for some types of regulations. For instance, 
a royal decree is simply a decision taken by the Cabinet, no matter whether it 
is a genuine regulation or simply an individual administrative decision; but, 
according to the principle of legality, a royal decree embodying an 
administrative decision may not violate a ministerial order of regulatory nature. 




























































































3. The scone of administrative rule-making power and the problem of
delegation.
The delimitation of the scope of administrative rule-making power in 
Spanish law is far from being linear and neat. First of all, there is a clear 
cleavage between present practice and traditional scholarly constructions, which 
had been partially followed by Supreme Court’s case-law. These constructions, 
which were intended to restrict arbitrary administrative action under the 
dictatorship, were based on a traditional Rechtsstaat doctrine, namely that only 
through statutory law is it admissible to affect citizens’ liberty and property. So, 
except for the field of administrative self-organization, all forms of 
administrative rule-making should be legitimized by statutory delegation. 
Nowadays, however, this doctrine is not respected in practice: in 1992, 
according to the entries in the official journal, only 50 State laws with statutory 
force were enacted, whereas some 400 State adminsitrative regulations were 
passed. This means that 88.9% of State law-making activity belonged to the 
category of administrative regulations. As for Regional law, taking into account 
only two significant Regions, the corresponding figures were 95.06% in 
Andalusia and 97.75% in Catalonia. These data show that, in practice, 




























































































administrative rule-making. In addition, despite its ambiguity in this respect, the 
Constitution offers support for such a practice.
A) Constitutional principles: reserves of statutory law and the 
recognition of the Government’s rule-making power.
The first element to be stressed is that the Constitution does not include 
a general reserve of statutory law, a sort of "liberty and property clause". There 
are many concrete reserves of statutory law throughout the Constitution, which 
deal with single subject-matters. It is also true that Art. 53.1 of the Constitution 
states that only through statutory law may fundamental rights be restricted or 
affected, so that some authors have invoked this constitutional provision in order 
to justify the existence of a general reserve. However, such interpretation is 
based on a dubious assumption, namely that the vis expansiva of fundamental 
rights is so powerful as to cover any kind of law-making affecting citizens’ 
rights and duties. At present, there is no consistent case-law, either from the 
Constitutional Court or from the Supreme Court, which supports this 
construction. It is reasonable, therefore, to say that the Constitution does not 
forbid all forms of independent administrative rule-making. In other words, 
independent administrative regulations are, in principle, admissible in those 




























































































long as there is a relevant reserve, only statutory delegation may authorize 
administrative rule-making.
Secondly, one has to remember that there are no fields constitutionally 
reserved to administrative rule-making. So the legislature is free to legislate even 
in those fields which are not subject to a reserve of statutory law and, when this 
happens, any room for independent administrative regulations disappears. Any 
field may be preempted by the legislature and then, by virtue of the principle of 
hierarchy, administrative regulations are admissible only following statutory 
delegation.
Thirdly, as has been indicated, it is the legislature that defines what 
administrative bodies have rule-making power. This is in itself an application of 
the idea of delegation and, consequently, the legislature is free to decide the 
scope of every type of administrative rule-making power.
Lastly, one must not forget the existence of an important exception. The 
Government’s administrative rule-making power has a direct constitutional origin 
(Art. 97 CE). As far as Regional law is concerned, similar provisions exist in 
some statutes of autonomy. It is generally accepted that this constitutional 




























































































as a whole, i.e. the Cabinet as opposed to single ministers. Art. 97 may be 
interpreted as empowering the Government to pass administrative regulations 
without a previous statutory delegation, of course as long as they do not 
encroach on a constitutional reserve of statutory law and do not violate any 
statute. From a teleological point of view, this interpretation is perfectly 
consistent with the above mentioned democratic legitimacy of the Government 
inherent to rationalized parliamentarism. Moreover, it provides a constitutional 
justification for the practice of wide governmental rule-making.
B) Delegation by the legislature: implementing regulations and 
withdrawal of statutory law.
The most common form of delegation by the legislature is the 
authorization of implementing regulations. It takes place whenever a statute 
envisages its own development through administrative regulations. It is up to the 
statute to establish the conditions which the implementing administrative 
regulation must fulfill. In any event, statutory authorization to pass implementing 
regulations may never be presumed. It must be explicit. This requirement derives 
both from the principle of hierarchy and from the constitutional reserves of 
statutory law. In addition, it is generally accepted that, whenever the authorizing 




























































































First, it is permanent, as long as the statute remains in force; secondly, it is 
subjected to the doctrine of the "indispensable complement". This doctrine 
means that the regulation must fill in those aspects where the statute is not 
complete, in order to produce a comprehensive body of rules inspired by 
identical principles; but it also means that the regulation may not introduce 
substantive innovations, nor develop the statute beyond what is strictly needed.
A radically different form of delegation takes place whenever the 
legislature authorizes direct administrative rule-making in a field formerly 
governed by statutory law. This phenomenon amounts to a withdrawal of 
statutory law and, therefore, is constitutionally valid only in those areas which 
are not covered by a reserve of statutory law. Much the same may be said of 
those cases where a statute simply states some guiding principles and defers to 
administrative regulations the bulk of the rule-making activity. An important 
sector where this happens is that of administrative organization, which includes 
the creation or abolition of ministries themselves. A rt 103.2 of the Constitution 
imposes a sort of relative reserve, according to which only the general principles 
of administartive organization must be established by the legislature. In this way, 
the Constitution gives public administration a power of self-organization. 
Needless to say, this does not imply that the Government is not politically 




























































































by Parliament through budgetary appropriations.
C) The sphere of independent administrative rule-making.
As a corollary, it should be clear now why there is such a quantitative 
predominance of administrative regulations over statutory law. One has to 
consider that much of the rule-making activity inherent in the welfare state and 
in the process of public regulation has an organizational nature. In this field, 
Spanish law acknoledges the admissibilty of independent administrative 
regulations. The same holds true, in practical terms, for most of the fields not 
covered by an explicit constituional reserve of statutory law.
4. Local authorities’ regulations.
The pattern which has just been described is not entirely applicable to 
local authorities’ regulations. No doubt, these regulations are hierarchical 
subordinated to State and Regional statutes and they must deal with subject- 
matters for which local authorities are responsible (land planning, transport, 





























































































On the one hand, the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy (Art. 137 
CE) involves that a minimum sphere of local competence must be safeguarded 
in any event and, consequently, municipalities and provinces may not be 
statutorily deprived of their rule-making power (STC 32/1981 and 214/1989). 
The main role of State and Regional legislatures in this respect lies in defining 
the scope of local responsibilities and regulating the mechanisms of local rule- 
making power.
On the other hand, this type of subordination to statutory law difers from 
ordinary forms of delegation. Local authorities’ regulations are not genuine 
implementing regulations vis-à-vis the corresponding State or Regional statutes, 
for two reasons. First, because the very purpose of these statutes is to allow for 
sufficient normative diversity in order for local authorities to meet their own 
peculiar needs; secondly, because local authorities are democratically elected and 
politically accountable bodies, entitled to design their own policies. In sum, the 
relationship between statutory law and local authorities’ regulations tends to be 
purely negative. Statutes function as a framework within which local authorities’ 




























































































5. Administrative rule-making procedure.
Spanish law does not provide for sufficient transparency and citizens’ 
participation in administrative rule-making. This defect is particularly serious 
since administrative regulations play such a relevant quantitative role in Spain. 
It is true that draft implementing regulations must be submitted to the Council 
of State, which in Spain has only an advisory nature. The opinions of the 
Council of State may deal both with questions of legality and expediency, but 
they are not binding upon the Government. It is also true that several statutes 
impose the duty to submit draft regulations to public consultation, so that the 
citizens may express their opinion. This is a general duty for local authorities. 
But the procedure is predominantly written and administrative bodies tend to 
comply with it in a most buraeucratic way, thus discouraging people from 
participating. Moreover, there is no legal duty to publish the results of such 
consultation.
So far, the courts have been lenient concerning the compliance with 
participatory requirements. They have tended to scrutinize only the substantive 
legality of administrative regulations. However, in recent years there seems to 




























































































Supreme Court (STS of 18 December 1988 and 17 January 1989) which 
invalidated two administrative regulations because they had been approved 
without due public consultation. In any event, a serious legislative reform is 
needed in this field.
6. Judicial review of administrative regulations.
As a form of administrative action, regulations are reviewed by 
administrative law courts (Arts. 58, 66 and 74 LOPJ), which are specialized 
divisions of Regional Superior Courts and the Supreme Court. In Spain, the 
duality of jurisdictions, ordinary and administrative, was abolished in 1904 and, 
since then, administrative law courts have always belonged to the ordinary 
judiciary. Given that administrative law courts alone have the power to review 
administrative action, only they may declare erga omnes the invalidity of 
unlawful regulations. Challenge against a regulation may be direct, for which 
any affected person has standing, or indirect. Indirect challenge takes place 
whenever the applicant for judicial review of an individual administrative 
decision questions the validity of the regulation on which such decision is 
legally based. Indirect review of unlawful regulations may also be accomplished 





























































































However, adjudication over administrative regulations does not constitute 
a genuine monopoly of any law court. All the other law courts (i.e. civil, 
criminal and labour courts) have a positive duty not to apply any administrative 
regulation which, being relevant to a case pending before them, is found to be 
unlawful because in contradiction with the Constitution, statutory law or a 
hierarchically superior regulation (Art. 6 LOPJ). This is a traditional principle 
of Spanish law, which derives directly from the idea of normative hierarchy. In 
other words, as far as administrative regulations are concerned, there exists a 
sort of diffuse or decentralized system of judicial review.
The Constitutional Court too may invalidate administrative regulations in 
two types of cases. First, through the recurso de amparo, whenever a regulation 
violates a fundamental right; secondly, there is a specific procedure for the 
national Government to challenge Regional administrative regulations which 






























































































Legislative decrees are governed by Arts. 82 to 85 of the Constitution. 
They are passed by the Government by virtue of a specific form of delegation 
which confers on them statutory force. So they may repeal or modify previous 
statutes. Their dual origin helps to explain their name, as well as the safeguards 
imposed on their use by the Constitution.
The delegation must be explicit and made by statute. It must be for a 
concrete and well defined subject-matter and must fix a deadline for its exercise. 
Contrary to ordinary delegation, it expires once the legislative decree is passed. 
The delegation must be adressed to the Government, which may not subdelegate 
to other bodies. However, if a delegation is still in force, the Government may 
veto any bill dealing with the same subject-matter. Needles to say, this does not 
imply that Parliament may not repeal the delegation at any moment. Finally, 
legislative decrees may not affect subject-matters which are constitutionally 





























































































Legislative decrees play an important role whenever law-making presents 
serious technical difficulties or demands special expertise. In other words, if 
Parliament considers that it lacks adequate competence, legislative decrees are 
the appropriate instrument. By fixing binding guidelines, the delegating statute 
defines the policy objectives, which will have to met by the legislative decree 
issued by the Government. In particular, legislative decrees are constitutionally 
intended to fulfill two different functions: consolidation and drafting.
A) The distinction between consolidation and drafting.
In the case of consolidation, the delegating statute enables the Government 
to merge already existing statutory provisions dealing with the same subject- 
matter. Thus, for the sake of clarity and certainty, the entire legal regime of such 
subject-matter, which was so far disperse throughout a variety of statutues, is 
integrated into one single text (texto refundido). The delegating statute must 
define the subject-matter and state whether the delegation includes the possibility 
of clarifying and harmonizing the existing statutory provisions. Only in this case 
is the Government entitled to re-draft those provisions. Otherwiswe, its task is 
merely that of systematization.




























































































authorized to create new law. The delegating statute must define the subject- 
matter and the scope of the delegation and, above all, fix carefully the principles 
and criteria to be followed. These guidelines (principles and criteria) take the 
form of a framework law, called ley de bases. The Government has to produce 
a systematic normative text (texto articulado) out of those guidelines. The 
legislative decree must to be in absolute conformity with the established 
guidelines.
Both law-making techniques have a long standing tradition in Spanish 
law. So the Constitution has simply acknowledged that practice introducing 
some additional safeguards. Consolidation has been particularly frequent in 
fields such as tax law, judicial procedure or criminal law. For example, the 
Criminal Code itself is embodied in a texto refundido. As for the experience 
of the leyes de bases and textos articulados, this device was first used in 1888 
in order to overcome the difficulties inherent in the elaboration of the Civil 
Code, which is also a legislative decree. More recently, as a consequence of the 
accession of Spain to the European Community, it has been used too in order 
to tranpose the acquis communeautaire into the Spanish legal system.




























































































Delegating statutes are genuine framework laws, because they fix 
objectives whixh have to be met by legislative decrees. This is particularly true 
in the second of the above mentioned hypotheses, since the ley de bases does 
not play a purely instrumental function, but contains also substantive guidelines. 
No doubt, the delegating statute draws the limits within which the legislative 
decree may lawfully operate and, therefore, any excess will lead to the invalidity 
of the legislative decree.
However, it is generally accepted that the legal force of the delegating 
statute does not go beyond this point. In other words, the guidelines are not 
directly applicable. The Supreme Court’s case-law, especially as far as the Civil 
Code is concerned, has always been extremely clear in this respect. At best, the 
gudelines may have some orienting value for the interpretation of the 
corresponding legislative decree.
C) The debate about the forms of control over legislative decrees.
Given their sratutory force, legislative decrees may be challenged before 
the Constitutional Court (Arts. 161 and 163 CE, Art. 27 LOTC). The Court may 
invalidate them either for substantive unconstitutionality or for ultra vires, i.e. 




























































































comply with the conditions established by the delegating statute, it indirectly 
violates Arts. 82 to 85 of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, there is a scholarly debate about the additional possibilty of 
diffuse judicial review of legislative decrees. Supporters of this form of control 
think that, as far as a legislative decree is ultra vires, it may not be deemed to 
receive statutory force. Otherwise, the legislature’s will, as expressed in the 
delegating statute, would be circumvented. The obvious conclusion is that, under 
these circumstances, the Government’s enactment is a mere administrative 
regulation and, moreover, one which contradicts statutory law. And since it 
amounts to an unlawful regulation, any law court may disapply an ultra vires 
legislative decree. As a constitutional basis for this construction, some authors 
invoke the last paragraph of Art. 82, which provides that without prejudice to 
the jurisdiction of law courts delegating statutes may introduce additional 
mechanisms of control over legislative decrees. The relevant point for their 
argumentation lies in the plural form, because Art. 82 does not refer to the 
Constitutional Court, but to law courts at large.
This construction has been subjected to severe criticism. First of all, it has 
been pointed out that it was devised by liberal lawyers under the dictatorship, 




























































































for some sort of control. Nowadays, however, there would be no good reason 
to deviate from the centralized system of judicial review of legislation only in 
the case of legislative decrees. The rationale in favour of a single Constitutional 
Court (i.e. legal certainty about the validity of statutory law) is fully applicable 
to legislative decrees too. As for the literal argument derived from Art. 82, 
critics rightly say that the primary purpose of this constitutional provision is not 
judicial review of legislative decrees, but to allow the legislature to introduce 
additional mechanisms of control over them. In other words, Art. 82 says that 
additional safeguards may not affect judicial review. The plural form could be 
explained by the fact that, in order to obtain a preliminary ruling from the 
Constitutional Court, ordinary law courts too play a role in this respect.
Concerning the possibility of additional mechanisms of control over 
legislative decrees, one has to consider that legislative decrees come into force 
by virtue of a simple governmental decision; that is to say, they need not be 
ratified by Parliament. However, the last paragraph of Art. 82 allows Parliament 
to impose, case by case, some sort of ratification procedure. This possibility 
follows a tradition inaugurated by the first enactment of the Civil Code in 1888. 
On that occasion, the Parliamnet considered that the Government had not fully 
respected the guidelines and forced it to prepare a revised version of the Civil 




























































































2. State and Regions: framework legislation and concurrent legislative
powers.
Framework legislation appears also in the sphere of State and Regional 
concurrent legislative powers. In enumerating subject-matters over which 
Regions may be given legislative power, Arts. 148 and 149 of the Constitution 
often declare the State’s right to regulate basic aspects of certain issues 
(administrative procedure, health care, environmental protection, etc.). The 
striking fact is that terminology is very similar to the one used by Arts. 82 to 
85: Iegislacion basics or condiciones basicas. But, as will be seen, this is a 
very different variety of framework legislation. Its complexity derives from the 
extraordinary richness of the relevant Constitutional Court’s case-law, which is 
in permanent evolution. Such case-law has been predominantly produced 
through the settlement of conflicts between the State and the Regions. One has 
to keep in mind that the main object of this type of procedure before the Court 
is not to examine the constitutionality of norms, but to declare whose is a 





























































































For the sake of completeness, one must also mention that Art. 150.1 of 
the Constitution envisages the possibility for the State legislature to delegate 
legislative power to the Regions in subject-matters of State exclusive 
competence. Such delegation should take the form of non-directly applicable 
guidelines, which define the sphere and limits of Regional action. However, this 
constitutional provision has never been used so far.
A) Function and direct applicability of framework legislation.
Framework legislation is the instrument for concurrent legislative powers. 
The guiding idea is that, in certain subject-matters, there must be 'a two-stage 
law-making process. The State regulates the basic aspects and the remaining 
field belongs to Regional legislation. However, this rough description is subject 
to many nuances and, in this sense, the starting point must be the inisistence of 
the Constitutional Court in differentiating this type of framework legislation 
from delegating statutes (STC 32/1981, 1/1982, etc.). The first consequence 
which may be drawn from such differentiation is that Regional concurrent 
legislative power does not derive from a delegation by the national Parliament, 
but directly from the Constitution and the statutes of autonomy.




























































































so much to define the limits of Regional legislative power, as to allow the State 
to impose certain general, national policy objectives; and this function is 
fulfilled by the regulation of the basic aspects of each subject-matter where 
concurrent legislation is constitutionally possible. Thus, a body of com m on 
minimum rules may be created. But this right of the State finds some limits 
Since by definition framework legislation does not operate in subject-matters of 
State exclusive legislative power, general policies must be compatible with 
Regional autonomous policies. Therefore, framework legislation must leave a 
suffiently broad margin of Regional legislative discretion, affecting only those 
aspects which are substantively basic, i.e. aspects which genuinely have national, 
general interest (STC 32/1983, 137/1986, etc.).
In sum, in the sphere of concurrent legislative powers, Regional legislation 
is not a mere development or implementation of State framework legislation. 
Perhaps, to define this type of State normative intervention as "framework" 
legislation is not entirely accurate. It does not establish guidelines to be followed 
by the Regions, but simply introduces some rules for the whole nation. Here lies 
another important difference in relation to delegating statutes: framework 
legislation is directly applicable (STC 1/1982). One must realize that 
paradoxically direct applicability works as a safeguard of effective Regional 




























































































minimum rules. But, contrary to what would happen if the State could fix 
binding guidelines, Regions are not positively obliged to follow a national 
policy objective.
This is the reason why, strictly speaking, framework legislation does not 
belong to the category of interposed norms. It is not hierarchically superior to 
Regional law. If Regional law deviates from framework legislation, it will not 
necessarily be unconstitutional. Usually, it will be disapplied by ordinary law 
courts, because in the sphere of concurrent powers State law prevails over 
Regional law (Art. 149.3 CE). In other words, Regional law does not have an 
a priori duty to respect certain provisions of State law; but if these State law 
provisions are intended to regualte basic aspects of a given subject-matter, they 
occupy the normative field and produce an effect of genuine preemption. This 
distinction between unconstitutionality and preemption has practical relevance 
because, in the case of preemption, Regional law remains formally in force and 
may be applicable again if State framework legislation disappears. This seems 




























































































B) Its flexibility concerning formal requirements.
Consistently with its statement that framework legislation (Arts. 148 and 
149 CE) is different from delegating statutes (Arts. 82 to 85 CE), the 
Constitutional Court has always maintained a predominantly substantive concept 
of framework legislation. In its early rulings, the Court held that the mere formal 
characterisation of a State norm as framework legislation is not sufficient. 
Framework legislation must actually deal with basic aspects of a relevant 
subject-matter; that is to say, its substantive content must reflect a genuine 
national interest As long as this general interest is not apparent, there is no 
framework legislation, no matter if the national Parliament has defined it as such 
or not (STC 1/1982, 76/1986, etc.). This is still the fundamental principle in this 
respect.
Moreover, in those same early rulings the Court declared that the 
condition of framework legislation does not necessarily require a formal 
characterisation. Given their nature and scope, certain State norms are 
framework legislation in any event. This is due to the fact that they regualte 
basic aspects of relevant subjet-matters (STC 32/1981,1/1982, etc.). In order to 




























































































antiformalism, one has to take some factors into account. At that time, the 
tendency to consider framework legislation as part of interposed norms (Le. as 
an instrument to define the distribution of powers between the State and the 
Regions) was much stronger than at present. The obvious consequence was to 
think that without previous framework legislation the Regions were prevented 
from exercising their concurrent legislative powers. So the State might paralyze 
an important part of newly acquired Regional autonomy by simply not enacting 
framework legislation. It was precisely to avoid such potential obstructionist 
strategy that the Court ruled that framework legislation might be inferred from 
preexisting State law. Those really basic aspects of legislation govening each 
relevant subject-matter were to be considered as framework legislation (STC 
32/1983, 29/1986, etc.).
Time passed by and the State started to pass specific framework 
legislation. Its true function was progressively clarified. At that point, the danger 
was no longer potential obstructionism, but an excess of framework legislation 
due to the fact that, in principle, many norms could substantively qualify for that 
condition. The Constitutional Court reacted and began to demand more formal 
conditions for framework legislation. The consequence is that, at present, 
framework legislation must identify itself as such for the sake of legal certainty. 




























































































valid. Only in exceptional circumsatnces is the Court prepared to accept 
anonymous State norms as framework legislation (STC 69/1988, 13/1989, etc.).
The question of hierarchy has undergone a similar evolution. At the 
beginning, the Constitutional Court admitted that framework legislation might 
occasionally be embodied in administrative regulations. This was especially so 
whenever the preexisting State law containing framework legislation was to be 
found in rules prior to the Constitution itself, i.e. rales dating from a time when 
reserves of statutory law were much more loose (STC 96/1984). Nowadays, 
framework legislation must be enacted in statutory form, although the possibility 
that implementing regulations share the framework legislation nature of their 
corresponding statutes exists (STC 69/1988, 13/1989, etc.). Moreover, it is 
generally admitted that framework legislation need not be embodied in specific 
statutes. For the sake of systematic coherence, statutes dealing with each 





























































































V. OTHER SOURCES OF LAW.
1. Collective agreements.
Through collective agreements, workers’ unions and employers’ 
associations establish labour conditions (salaries, working hours, holidays, etc.). 
Thus, they are essentially a mechanism of negotiation and self-regulation. In 
Spanish law, collective agreements have a long standing tradition and play a 
relevant role, both of which are not entirely alien to the paternalistic and 
corporatist ideology of dictatorship. At present, the right to collective bargaining 
is constitutionally recognised, as is the binding force of its outcome: collective 
agreements (Art. 37 CE).
In Spain, collective agreements are governed by the Estatuto de los 
Trabajadores of 1980, which is the general statute in the sphere of labour law. 
Collective agreements are not a purely private contract, binding among those 
who have negotiated it. On the contrary, as long as they have been regularly 
concluded, they posess erga omnes force, of course within the corresponding 
territory (nation, region, province) and sector of industry. The position of 
collective agreements among sources of labour law is twofold: first, they are 




























































































regulations and, consequently, are invalid if in contradiction with them; but, 
secondly, valid collective agreements are lex specialis in relation to statutes and 
regulations and, therefore, enjoy applicative priority over them. The same pattern 
governs relations among collective agreements themselves: more concrete 
collective agreements, by reason of territory or sector, are subordinated to the 
more general ones, but at the same time they are applied in the first place. 
Judicial review of collective agreements lies within the jurisdiction of labour law 
courts. However, contrary to what happens with administrative regulations, 
private individuals may challenge the validity of a collective agreement only 
incidentally, i.e. when it is relevant for the ruling of a pending case. This 
statutory ban on individuals’ direct challenge against collective agreements has 
been upheld by the Constitutional Court, since it represents a reasonable 
deterrent against potential obstructionist manoeuvres by minor workers’ unions 
or employers’ associations (STC 47/1988 and 124/1988).
This leads directly to the procedural problem of collective bargaining. 
Since collective agreements are genuine sources of law, they must be concluded 
through a procedure with appropriate guarantees. The basic question in this 
respect is who may negotiate and conclude generally binding collective 
agreements. In order to avoid an unmanageable multiplication of interlocutors, 




























































































that is, only those workers’ unions which have reached a minimum degree of 
representativeness in a given territory or sector are entitled to participate in 
collective bargaining. Such representativeness is determined by the results of 
periodical elections for workers’ representatives. However, the Constitutional 
Court has held that this idea of representativeness may not be used for any other 
purpose and, particularly, to define which workers’ unions may take part in the 
supervision of those elections. For the sake of transparency, every workers’ 
union running in the elections is allowed to sit in the supervisory bodies (STC 
7/1990 and 32/1990). An additional procedural guarantee lies in the duty to 
register collective agreements in a public record, which assures their publicity.
2. Rule-making bv private persons.
Rule-making by private persons does not present peculiar characteristics 
in Spanish law. Generally speaking, it follows the normal pattern of most legal 
systems which belong to the civil law family. However, for the sake of 
completeness, reference will be made to the two major forms of law-making by 





























































































Customary law consists of rales and principles created through usage and 
social practice. In order to be a real custom, usage must be accompanied by the 
so-called opinio iuris sive necessitatis, i.e. the general acceptance that such 
usage is legally binding. In addition, a firmly rooted case-law tradition declares 
that the maxim iura novit curia is not applicable to customary law. In other 
words, given the uncertainty about some customs, law courts may require the 
party invoking a customary rale to prove its existence and scope. Custom 
operates predominantly in the field of private law. Its importance as a genuine 
source of law is clearly lesser in other areas of the legal system.
Art. 1 of the Civil Code provides that custom is applicable in the absence 
of legislation, which in this context is synonymous with written law 
(administrative regulations as well as statutory law). Consequently, custom is a 
subsidiary source of law. In order to be valid, custom must not be contrary to 
legislation or to generally accepted moral standards. This means that there is no 
room for customs contra legem. As for merely interpretative usages or customs 
secundum legem, they are not considered to be binding except in those cases 
where there is an explicit legislative reference to them. In other words, since by 




























































































interpretation and application of law judges are not obliged to follow social 
practices but only legislation itself (Art. 117.1 CE). In the field of business law, 
where custom usually plays a particularly relevant role, the situation is basically 
the same. In fact, Art. 2 of the Code of Commerce of 1885 provides that 
comercial usages are applicable in the absence of legislation. One important 
practical difference lies in the fact that commercial usages are often unofficially 
codified by private entities (chambers of commerce, banks associations, etc.), 
thus facilitating their knowledge and improving legal certainty at large.
The status of custom is different in some Regions which have their own 
systems of private law. Since the unification of Spanish private law and the 
introduction of a single, national Civil Code proved to be extremely difficult 
along the whole 19th century, a political compromise was reached. Regions with 
specific private law institutions were allowed to preserve them, especially in the 
areas of family law and law of succession. At present, this situation enjoys 
constitutional support (Art. 149.1.8 CE). As a result, in some of these Regions 
(for example, Navarre), customary law takes precedence over legislation and, in 
this sense, one may speak of customs contra legem.
Apart from its function as a subsidiary source of law, custom also serves 




























































































1287 of the Civil Code and Arts. 52 and 59 of the Code of Commerce establish
that obscure clauses in contracts must be interpreted in conformity with usage. 
Moreover, according to Art. 1258 of the Civil Code, parties to a contract are 
obliged not only to its explicit clauses, but also to what is usual in the 
corresponding type of transaction.
B) Private autonomy.
Private autonomy involves the freedom of self-regulation of private law 
relationships, especially those having an economic nature. In societies founded 
on economic liberalism, such right of self-regulation is the major source of 
legitimacy for law-making by private persons. In Spain, private autonomy is 
given general recognition by Arts. 1091 and 1255 of the Civil Ĉ . de. Nowadays, 
the fundamental rights of private property and economic initiative (Arts. 33 and 
38 CE) provide private autonomy with constitutional protection. In private law 
transactions, individuals are entitled to introduce those clauses they consider to 
be appropriate, with only the limits of generally accepted moral standards and 
imperative legislative rules (ius cogens). This means that, in principle, 
individuals have a right to derogate from private law legislation, which has a 
subsidiary function. The major law-making manifestations of private autonomy 




























































































persons (corporations, associations, foundations, etc.). Although they have a 
private origin, the governing rules of such entities are acknowledged by the legal 
system.
3. Regulations of semi-public bodies.
In Spain, there is a long list of moral persons whose rules are recognised 
as part of the legal system and, consequently, enforced by law courts. Such list 
includes professional associations (medical doctors, practising lawyers, etc.), 
chambers of commerce, users of public water resources, etc. In the past, when 
the official political culture was clearly oriented towards corporatism, these 
moral persons were regarded as a prolongation of public administration. 
Nowadays, a much more liberal approach prevails. They are, in principle, private 
associations because they are set up and organized on private initiative. But 
since the legislature may make them responsible for the fulfillment of certain 
public functions, they present a public aspect too (STC 89/1989), which allows 
to speak of semi-public bodies. For example, lawyers’ associations initially have 
private objectives (information, medical insurance, etc.), but they also carry out 
some statutorily defined tasks, such as verification of the conditions of access 




























































































As far as they fulfill public functions, the regulations and decisions of 
these semi-public bodies are considered to be administrative action and are 
subject to judicial review by administrative law courts. Needless to say, 
regulations passed by semi-public bodies are not binding on the general public, 
but only on those individuals who belong to the corresponding category. These 
regulations are hierarchically subordinated to statutory law and are ultra vires 
whenever impose duties not envisaged by the delegating statute.
4. Administrative guidelines.
Statutes dealing with the organization of public administration enable high 
officials to issue guidelines, which must be addressed to their subordinates. This 
power is constitutionally based upon the hierarchical structure of public 
administration (Art. 103.1 CE) and is necessary for bureaucratic command and 
coordination. It may be exercised through single orders or general circular letters 
and instructions. Strictly speaking, only these general instructions deserve the 
characterization as administrative guidelines. Since they need not be officially 
published, it may be difficult to know of their existence or to be sure about their 
contents.




























































































or their compulsory nature for administrative officials. The major problem, on 
the contrary, has always been that of their binding effect vis-à-vis private 
individuals and their justiciability. In other words, administrative guidelines 
constitute a clear legal notion in the internal sphere of public administration, but 
their status is ambiguous as far as the relationship between public administration 
and private individuals is concerned. This may be particularly serious in some 
areas of administrative action, especially those related to economic regulation, 
where administrative guidelines play a very relevant role.
The Supreme Court’s case-law tends to deny adminsitrative guidelines the 
nature of genuine administrative regulations because they do not meet the 
required formal and procedural conditions (STS of 16 June 1981, 20 December 
1983, etc.). As a corollary, private individuals are not directly bound by them. 
But such conclusion does not solve two further problems. First, if an 
administrative decision is based on a guideline, may the affected individual 
challenge its validity arguing that the guideline is unlawful?; and secondly, if an 
administrative body deviates from a guideline, may the affected individual 
invoke it in his favour? Spanish case-law is not at all clear in this respect. 
Concerning the first question, the Supreme Court seems not to accept the 
justiciability of administrative guidelines (STS of 18 April 1983 and 30 




























































































might argue that derogating from an administrative guideline ammounts to a 





























































































VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMUNITY LAW AND DOMESTIC
LAW.
1. International treaties and domestic law.
The Spanish Constitution is relatively poor concerning the status of 
general or customary international law within the domestic legal system. The 
Preamble of the Constitution proclaims that, among the objectives of the nation, 
is the desire to strengthen peaceful and cooperative relations with all other 
peoples. In a more concrete way, Art. 10.2 of the Constitution states that the 
constitutional provisions declaring fundamental rights must be interpreted in 
conformity with international treaties on human rights ratified by Spain and with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nevertheless, the Constitution is 
much more precise as far as international treaties are concerned. In this field, 
one has to diffrentiate between the position of treaties in domestic law and the 
conditions for their valid conclusion.
A) The position of treaties in the national system of sources of law.
Spain has a monistic approach to the question of the relationship between 




























































































absolutely clear in declaring that, if they are validly concluded and published in 
the official journal, international treaties form part of the domestic legal system. 
So they are directly applicable and enforceable by law courts. Moreover, 
according to Art. 96.1, only through the appropriate procedure envisaged by 
treaties themselves or by general international law (i.e. the law of tretaies as 
codified by Convention of Vienna) may rules included in international treaties 
be repealed, amended or suspended. This means that, in their condition as 
sources of domestic law, international treaties may not be affected by other 
sources, including statutory law. This constitutional provision has led some 
authors to think that, in the Spanish legal system, treaties are hierarchically 
superior to any other source of law except the Constitution itself. In particular, 
they would be in an intermediate position between the Constititon and statutory 
law.
The first part of such statement is undobtedly accurate, since international 
treaties are subordinated to the Constitution and, consequently, are invalid if in 
contratdiction with it. They may be challenged before the Constitutional Court 
in the same way as statutory law, i.e. either directly or indirectly (Art. 27 
LOTC). In addition, the conclusion of an international treaty including a 
provision contrary to the Constitution requires a pior constitutional amendment; 




























































































Constitutional Court for an advisory opinion, which has a binding effect (Art. 
95 CE). This is the only hypothesis in which the Constitutional Court is allowed 
to give advisory opinions.
The relationship between international treaties and statutory law is not so 
clear-cut. No doubt, Art. 96.1 prevents the legislature from repealing or 
modifying a treaty already in force and, in this sense, one may say that treaties 
are stronger than statutory law. However, this peculiar force of international 
treaties does not ammount to a superior hierarchical position, at least for two 
reasons. First, it is not clear whether international treaties may repeal previous 
legislation. It seems that Art. 96.1 simply involves applicative priority. So 
previous legislation incompatible with a treaty is not applicable, but it remains 
formally in force. The consequence is that, if the treaty is abrogated, that 
legislation will automatically be applicable again. Secondly, international treaties 
are not considered as criteria for the assessment of the constitutionality of 
statutory law; that is, international treaties do not belong to the category of 
interposed norms. This implies that a statute passed in contradiction with a 




























































































B) Requirements for the conclusion and denunciation of treaties.
As has been mentioned, international treaties become part of the domestic 
legal system if they have been validly concluded and officialy published. For 
this purpose, a valid conclusion is not only one in conformity with international 
law itself, but also one which complies with constitutional requirements. As far 
as the State’s assent to a treaty is concerned, the Constitution envisages three 
hypotheses. First of all, whenever a treaty involves transfer of powers deriving 
from the Constitution (i.e. sovereign rights) to an international organization, the 
signature requires prior parliamentary authorization by an ad hoc organic law 
(Art. 93 CE). This constitutional provision was intended to cover Spanish 
accession to the European Community and was actually used in 1985 for that 
purpose. It had not been used, however, when Spain joined NATO, probably 
because the Government felt there was not a suffient parliamentary majority. 
The issue was legally unclear, because Spain refused to become a member of 
the unified military command and, consequently, there was no direct transfer of 
sovereign rights; but, in any event, the procedural choice raised strong political 
criticism and ultimately led to a consultative referendum. Secondly, there are 
some categories of international treaties (treaties of political or military nature, 




























































































parliamentary authorization (Art. 94.1 CE). According to the standing orders of 
both houses of Praliament, this authorization is not intended to take the form of 
a statute but of a resolution. Lastly, all other treaties do not require prior 
authorization. The Government is free to give the State’s assent, but must inform 
Parliament immediately after (Art. 94.2 CE).
Two further aspects deserve to be noticed. On the one hand, under 
Spanish law, treaties need not be ratified. As has just been observed, 
parliamentary control over the Government’s conclusion of international treaties 
takes place a priori, in the form of an authorization which, by definition, 
imposes some limits. On the other hand, the Government has a statutory duty 
to submit every draft treaty to the Council of State for a non-binding advisory 
opinion. This opinion, which is usually followed, contains an indication about 
the most appropriate procedure.
2. Community law and domestic law.
Spanish accession to the Europen Community did not pose any specific 
constitutional problems. Spain had been able to take advantage of other Member 
States’ experience in this respect and, consequently, Art. 93 had been included 




























































































to the Community. This constitutional provision has been used not only for 
accession itself, but also for later amendments to the Constitutive Treaties: the 
Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht. In sum, from the point of 
view of primary Community law, only an ad hoc organic law is constitutionally 
needed.
If a new provision of the Constitutive Treaties is in contradiction with the 
Constitution, a prior constitutional amendment is unavoidable (Art. 95.1 CE). 
This happened when the Treaty of Maastricht introduced a new Art. 8B into the 
EEC Treaty. Since Art. 13.2 of the Spanish Constitution only envisaged 
foreigners’ active suffrage in local elections but not their right to ran for office, 
a constitutional amendment was approved in 1992. This constitutional 
amendment followed an opinion of the Constitutional Court delivered on 1 July 
1992, which had been requested by the Government in compliance with Art. 
95.2 of the Constitution.
The principles of direct effect and supremacy of secondary Community 
law have never raised any serious constituional objection. It is generally 
accepted that they are inherent to the notion of transfer of powers deriving from 
the Constitution. In other words, nobody questions that Art. 93 of the 




























































































legislation within the domestic legal system.
3. The attitude of the Constitutional Court towards European integration.
On the whole, one may fairly say that the Spanish Constitutional Court 
has a positive and cooperative attitude towards European integration. In the 
above mentioned opinion of 1 of July of 1992, concerning the constitutionality 
of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Court held that only with respect to the issue of 
suffrage in local elections was a previous constitutional amendment needed. In 
comparison with similar judicial rulings in other Member States, the Court 
adopted a literal approach to constitutional interpretation in the case of the 
Treaty of Maastricht. So only that provision of the Treaty which was in open 
contradiction with the Spanish Constitution was considered to be 
unconstitutional. This means that, as far as the expansion of the Constitutive 
Treaties is concerned, the Court is prepared to accept that Art. 93 of the Spanish 
Constitution provides, in principle, enough constitutional basis. There is no 
reason to think that such attitude will change in the forseeable future. Probably, 
this attitude of the Constitutional Court is not alien to the fact that there is a 
very wide political consensus in Spain concerning European integration.




























































































about the status of Community law within the Spanish legal system emerge from 
its case-law. The Court’s most important doctrine in this respect concerns the 
principle of supremacy. Although it acknowledges that Community law prevails 
over domestic law, the Court has clearly said on several occasions that 
supremacy of Community law does not involve its constitutionalization en bloc. 
Thus, when the Spanish law governing elections to the European Parliament 
(which establishes a single constituency for the whole country with a purely 
proportional electoral formula) was challenged, the Court ruled that, in any 
event, a hypothetical violation of Community law does not ammount to the 
unconstitutionality of the law. Moreover, the Court said that it is not its duty to 
watch over the compliance of domestic law with Community law as a whole, 
but only with those of its principles having constitutional implications (STC 
28/1991). The same idea of non-constitutionalization of Community law is 
applicable in the sensitive field of fundamental rights. Thus, rights recognized 
by the Constitutive Treaties do not automatically acquire the condition of 
fundamental rights, especially to the effect of their protection through the 
recurso de amparo. This privileged form of judicial protection is applicable to 
them only as far as they are also recognized by the Spanish Constitution. 
Otherwise, in constitutional terms, they simply have an interpretative value by 
virtue of Art. 10.2 of the Constitution (STC 64/1991). This does not mean, of 




























































































As a corollary, it is clear in the Court’s case-law that the principle of supremacy 
of Community law does not enable Spanish public authorities to derogate from 
the Constitution.
This doctrine is particularly relevant for the relationship between the State 
and the Regions. In an early case, the Court had to rule a conflict between the 
State and Catalonia concerning the implementation of a Community directive in 
the field of agriculture. The directive explicitly stated that implementation 
should be accomplished by the corresponding "central authority" in each 
Member State, presumably in order to insure its uniform application. However, 
the Constitutional Court held that the definition of what is a central authority in 
Spain is not a responsibilty of the European Community, but belongs to the the 
Spanish Constitution. Consequently, it declared that, in the relevant subject- 
matter, the autonomous Region of Catalonia was to be constitutionally 
considered as the central and ultimate authority (STC 252/1988). In other words, 
membership to the European Community does not affect the constitutional 
distribution of powers between the State and the Regions.
In the end, one may conclude that the Spanish Constitutional Court does 
not distrust European integration and is ready to cooperate with European 




























































































determined not to allow circumventions of unambiguous provisions and 





























































































The best single analysis of the Spanish system of sources of law is 
probably I. DE OTTO, Derecho Constitucional (Sistema de Fuentes), Ariel, 
Barcelona, 1987. Unfortunately, given the early death of the author, this book 
has not been updated.
Good and comprehensive expositions can be found in the following 
textbooks: E. GARCIA DE ENTERRIA and T.R. FERNANDEZ, Curso de 
Derecho Administrative, vol. I, 6th ed., Civitas, Madrid, 1993 and JA . 
SANTAMARIA, Fundamentos de Derecho Administrative, Centro de 
Estudios Ramon Areces, Madrid, 1988. Another two relevant basic books are: 
J. PEREZ ROYO, Las Fuentes del Derecho, Tecnos, Madrid, 1984 and F. 
BALAGUER, Fuentes del Derecho, vol. n , Tecnos, Madrid, 1992. A collection 
of monographic essays on different aspects of the system of sources of law, 
written by several authors, is to be found in Estudios sobre la Constitution 
Espanola (Homenaje al Prof. E. Garcia de Enterria), vol. I, Civitas, Madrid, 
1991. All these books provide further specialized bibliographic information.




























































































consult E. AJA, M. CARRILLO and E. ALBERTI, Manual de Jurisprudencia 
Constitucional, Civitas, Madrid, 1990. Two periodicals, the Revista Espanola 
de Derecho Constitucional and the Anuario de Derecho Constitucional y 
Parlamentario, offer yearly reports on the judgements of the Constitutional 
Court.
Lastly, a good analysis of the relationship between Community law and 
Spanish constitutional law has recently been accomplished by P. PEREZ 
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